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False Memory, False Self — 3
The Changing Face of Memory and Self

“To say to him ‘change yourself means to demand that everything should change,
even the past.” Nietzche

Who am I? At some point all of us have asked this question, looking for answers in all the
obvious places: Am I a product of my environment, my genes, my family, or my friends? Part of
who we are is defined by our past and our memories of our past. Using a narrative framework,
people can express their diverse and complicated identities through the stories they tell. With one
story, people can communicate their past, present, and future. They can describe their goals, their
loves, their philosophy of life, and the moral guidelines they follow. Through this system, people
can string together several categories of self-representation into a single tale or multiple stories
that they share with others. In order to create these identity narratives, people must be able to
access a vast network of information about their lives. Thus, memories play a vital role in the
search for self Clearly, memory and narrative do not encompass the entire definition of self
James (1890) and Neisser (1988), among many others, have argued that the self is composed of a
variety of information garnered from several sources. Nonetheless, the remembered self becomes
the basic fabric of self that is communicated to others and used to plan for the future.
However, there is small conundrum with this system of self-representation: memory is an
unreliable foundation on which to build an identity. The retrieval of memories is dependent on
current circumstances. People can forget events, or their memories may be distorted by
subsequent information. In addition, people may create entirely false memories. An individual’s
self concept may drive the selection of memories that are recalled, which in turn might contribute
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to the distortion of the past. Remembering is a constructive process, and while the self is
constructed through memories, the construction of memories is also influenced by the self For
example, an individual may think of his- or herself as hard working. When describing the past,
that person will retrieve events that fit with that description and not events that suggest laziness.
Other events may be modified to fit with the hard-working description. Consequently, the types
of memories that we remember and how we tell our self narratives may be altered to reflect the
life themes that we have adopted. Thus the relationship between memories and self is circular:
Memories define and shape the self while the self shapes the memories that are retrieved.
Imagine what happens if an individual suddenly remembers a past event that does not
correspond with the self concept? Would this new piece of the puzzle change the life narrative,
the identity, the self? Would the person reject the memory and deny the reality? Consider an
example from a work of fiction, A Thousand Acres, by Jane Smiley (1991). Ginny, the main
character is suddenly informed by her sister. Rose, that they were both sexually abused by their
father. Ginny, however, does not remember any abuse and contests her sister’s suggestions.
Rose counters by reciting details of how she used to watch their father go into Ginny’s room at
night for extended periods of time, using her clock to check when he entered and left. Ginny
resisted and claimed memory for shorter visits than what Rose reports. Later, however, during a
visit to her father’s house, Ginny laid down on the same bed she used as a child. With a flash of
emotional clarity, Ginny’s memory flooded back to her. “Lying here, I knew that he had been in
there with me, that my father had lain with me on that bed, that I had looked at the top of his
head, at his,balding spot in the brown grizzled hair ... (Smiley, 1991, p. 229).” Eventually Ginny
rose from the bed and left her parents’ house, and she thought to herself that “a new life, yet
another new life, had begun early in the day” (Smiley, 1991, p. 229). Smiley’s account of Ginny’s
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memory highlights the relationship between memory and identity. Her new life begins with the
recovery of a memory. Therefore, the change in memory can affect an individual’s entire
understanding of self A change in the past, changes the present. In Smiley’s story, not only did
the revelation affect Ginny’s sense of self, but it also affected her relationship with her sister.
Rose. Rose had always thought that the abuse, even when not part of the conversation, was an
experience that they shared. Thus memories define not only the self but also the relationship of
the individual to others, defining families, fiiends, social groups, and culture. When memory
changes, people change how they conceive of themselves and their relationships with others.
Although Ginny and her memories are the fictional creation of Jane Smiley, like much
fiction they represent the experiences that many real individuals have. As has been documented
several times recently, people discover memories for events of which they believe they were
previously unaware. This can even happen with traumatic experiences such as child abuse
(Schooler, Bendikson, & Ambadar, 1997; Williams, 1995). When people discover such
experiences in their past, it affects their current understanding of their selves, alters their plans for
the future, and impacts the most important relationships in their lives.
The impact of the discovered memories will be felt whether the events truly were
experienced, forgotten, and only recently remembered, or whether the memories have been
created via memory construction. This is important to note, for just as people can recover
memories of traumatic childhood experiences, they can also create false memories. Pendergrast
(1995) has told the stories of individuals who have discovered memories that were later confirmed
by external sources and of individuals who recovered memories that they eventually came to
believe were false. In both cases, the self-concept was dramatically affected as people began to
think of themselves as abuse survivors. In both cases, relationships with family members were
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affected. People can not easily and reliably distinguish between recovered true memories and
created false memories (Hyman & Pentland, 1996). What people know is that the memories are
their memories -- thus, they act on the memories they possess, and the self and family
relationships are reshaped.
In this chapter we will review the recent research on creating complete false memories,
outline a theory of the processes involved in memory creation, describe some new research on
those processes, and finally return for a discussion of ramifications of false memories on the self
concept. If self and memory codetermine each other, how comfortable can any of us feel in our
conceptualization of ourselves knowing that some of the memories that create the self may be
false?
Research on False Childhood Memories
Memory researchers have studied errors in memory for a variety of materials: word lists
(Roediger & McDermott, 1995), short stories (Bartlett, 1932), songs (Hyman & Rubin, 1990),
and personal experiences (e.g., Barclay & DeCooke, 1988, Neisser, 1982). Some of the classic
research on memory errors has investigated eyewitness memory and the misinformation effect
(e.g. Belli, 1989; Lindsay, 1990; Loftus, 1979; Loftus, Donders, Hoffman, & Schooler, 1989;
McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1984; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). In misinformation studies people first
experience an event (for example, they watch a video of a car accident), then they are given
misleading post-event information or misinformation (they are told the car went past a stop sign
when it actually was shown passing a yield sign), and finally they incorporate the misinformation
into their recollections of the event when later tested. These studies illustrate that misinformation
provided after the event occurred can alter what people remember about an event.

False Memory, False Self — 7

The results of these misinformation studies have been applied to therapy situations where
suggestions about the past are made (Lindsay & Read, 1994; Loftus, 1993). For example,
consider a person who has experienced a benign childhood (the original event). Several years
later someone suggests that abuse may have occurred during childhood (the misinformation).
Eventually, after several such suggestions, the person includes abuse as a part of the story of
childhood. In Jane Smiley’s fictional example with Ginny, Rose’s suggestions of abuse could
have been strong enough to mislead her sister into creating a memory—especially considering
Ginny was in her childhood house, a place that cued numerous childhood memories. Thus when
Ginny’s growing animosity toward her father and Rose’s suggestions about sexual abuse are
combined within the context of true childhood memories, Ginny entered a state of mind that was
very conducive to memory creation.
Such misinformation studies, however, do not provide clear evidence that a false memory
for a complete event can be created through recurring suggestions. There are several differences
between misinformation experiments and the creation of false childhood memories that make this
comparison risky (Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995). First, misinformation experiments
demonstrate that aspects of an event can be created in response to misleading suggestions, but not
that entire life events can be created in response to misleading suggestions. In addition, in most of
the misinformation studies, the event is not related to the self nor is the self-involved in the event,
while for false childhood memories the self is intimately involved. Finally, in misinformation
studies the participants usually have little or no emotional involvement with the event whereas in
the creation of false childhood memories the event may be very emotional. All of these
differences make the creation of false childhood memories less likely that the introduction of
errors to a memory.
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In response to these concerns in generalizing the misinformation effect studies, several
researchers have altered the misinformation methodology and come to a general working method
for studying false memories (Ceci, Huffman, Smith, & Loffus, 1994; Ceci, Loffus, Leichtman, &
Bruck, 1994; Hyman & Billings, 1998; Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995; Hyman & Pentland,
1996; Loffus & Pickrell, 1995; Pezdek, Finger, & Hodge, 1997). For the most part, researchers
request from family members information about events that occurred during the participant’s
childhood. The participant is then asked to try to recall these true events along with a false event
“ an event that the researchers are fairly sure did not happen to the participant. During a series of
interviews the false event is presented as if it is also a true event that was obtained from the initial
family solicitation. The participants are usually interviewed repeatedly about both the true and
false events and told their memories will improve over time. The most meaningful result of this
sort of study is how the participants respond to the false event -- do the participants come to
believe that the event took place sometime during their childhood? Do they elaborate on the false
event by importing details not contained in the original presentation of the false event? Do they
contend the event is a personal memory? If this is the case, this would be evidence for the
creation of an entire, self-involved, and somewhat emotional memory.
For example, Hyman et al. (1995) utilized this methodology in a study involving the
childhood memories of college students. In their second experiment, the researchers obtained
descriptions of true childhood events involving introductory psychology students through surveys
sent to their parents. When the questionnaires were returned, the researchers asked the students
to participate in a series of interviews investigating their memory for early childhood experiences.
In each of three interviews (separated by one day), the students were asked to remember several
true event plus one false event. For all events, the interviewer provided the students with a basic
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description (including age, event, a few actions, other people involved, and a location) and asked
the students what they remembered about the event. Three different false events were used in this
study. For example, one was called the punch bowl event: when you were 6 years old, you were
at the wedding of a friend of the family, you were running around with some other kids when you
bumped into the table the punch bowl was sitting on, and spilled on the parents of the bride. All
of the false events were self-involving and would have been somewhat emotional at the time of
the event, although none were traumatic events.
In general, the results of this study showed that participants recalled a majority of the true
events in the first interview and remembered even more of the true events over time. There are
two ways to explain the increased recall of the true events. First, by thinking about the events
over a period of time, the students provided themselves with additional memory cues that led to
the recollection of previously unretrieved memories. Another possibility is that the participants
have created, rather than recalled, memories that match the cues provided to them in the
interviews. We cannot say whether this recovery of memory for the true experience represents
actual memories or the creation of memories.
Regarding the false events, no participants remembered the false event on its initial
presentation, however, by the third interview 25% of the students (13 students) reported
remembering the event. Six students reported memories that were very clear and included the
critical information (such as turning over the punch bowl) as well as consistent elaborations (such
as their parents being upset). Five of the reports were less clear; the students included little of the
critical suggested information although they elaborated in a consistent fashion. Two of the
students created clear images, but they were not positive about whether they were remembering
or simply imagining the events that had been suggested to them.
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Although Hyman et al. used only college students in their study, other studies using
varying populations (e.g. preschool children, adults, teenagers) and different false events have
found similar results (Ceci, Huffman, Smith, & Loftus, 1994; Ceci, Loftus, Leichtman, & Bruck,
1994; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Pezdek, Finger, & Hodge, 1997). Other researchers have shown
that suggestions that are not based on parent/family information have the necessary demand
characteristics to create false memories (Kelley, Amodio, & Lindsay, 1996; Lindsay, 1997;
Loftus, 1997). People will create false memories of childhood experiences. These false memories
can be clear, somewhat emotional, self-involved, and holistic.
Nonetheless, questions of generalizability still remain. Spilling a punch bowl at a wedding
is not the same as being sexually abused. To this point, no researcher has attempted to have
participants create memories of being sexually abused. For ethical reasons, it is unlikely that
anyone ever will; If memories impact one’s self concept and family relationships whether the
memories are true or false, then experimentally inducing such memories would be atrocious.
While this makes generalizing to sexual abuse memories difficult, it is not impossible. First, real
world cases often provide dramatic evidence that individuals can create memories of a great
variety of events. For example, two boys in Chicago recently confessed to murdering another
child after being aggressively interviewed by police. Physical evidence discovered later indicated
that the boys could not have committed the crime. Second, an understanding of the factors that
affect memory creation and the processes involved in memory creation will allow some
generalization to situations that share characteristics.
Factors Contributing to False Memory Creation
Thus research on false memories has moved to the study of factors that make memory
creation more or less likely to occur. First, Hyman and his colleagues (Hyman & Billings, 1998;
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Hyman et al., 1995) found that students’ responses in the initial interview predicted who would
eventually create false memories. Individuals who talked about related self-knowledge were more
likely to create false memories than individuals who did not describe self-knowledge. This
indicates that individuals construct false memories by combining the false suggestions with true
information from their own pasts. This will make it difficult to identify a false memory because it
will contain some true information. Second, Hyman and Pentland (1996) ascertained that mental
imagery increases the probability of creating a false memory. Individuals who created and
described images of false events were more likely to create false memories. In addition, individual
differences among participants also plays a part in the creation of false childhood memories.
Hyman and Billings (1998) found that false memory creation is related to the Dissociative
Experiences Scale (r = .48) and the Creative Imagination Scale (r = .38). Pezdek et al. (1997)
found that the plausibility of the event also plays a role. Participants are more likely to create
false memories of events that match their self schemas and are thus more plausible.
These studies all relied on the basic methodology of false childhood memory research.
Unfortunately, this methodology is both difficult to perform and intrusive. Thus we have been
exploring a variety of different methods that allow us to investigate the processes involved in false
memory creation.
A Theory of False Memory Creation
Hyman and Kleinknecht (in press) suggested three processes that are involved in the
creation of false childhood memories: plausibility judgments, memory construction, and source
monitoring errors of claiming the constructed narrative as a personal memory. In order for a
person to create a false memory, the suggested event needs to be plausible. In other words, the
event needs to be something that the person is willing to believe could have happened to them.
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For example, some participants in Hyman’s studies (Hyman & Billings, 1998; Hyman et al., 1995;
Hyman & Pentland, 1996) did not create memories of spilling a punch bowl at a wedding because
they believed that they had never attended a wedding as child. They refused to accept the event
as a plausible personal experience. Similarly, Pezdek et al. (1997) found that less plausible events
are less likely to lead to memory creation. Plausibility is not, however, something that is
automatically associated with an event. Instead, it is a judgment that people make based on
various types of information.
Since plausibility is a judgment, several factors may influence whether a person sees an
event as plausible. For example, the source of the suggestion will affect plausibility assessments.
In the typical false memory experiment, the suggested event is presented by an experimenter and
the information is based on information supposedly from the participant’s parents—these are two
generally reliable sources of information (although students would occasionally question their
parent’s accuracy). Not only will the source affect whether a person views an event as plausible,
but the event itself will determine whether a person views this event as something that usually
happens. For instance, most people may not consider abduction by extraterrestrials a likely event,
while for others this may be an event that they consider common. Spanos, Cross, Dickson, and
DuBreuil (1993) found that belief in alien visitations was the primary variable that differentiated
people who claimed memories of UFO experiences from individuals who did not claim such
experiences. Thus judgments about the general frequency of an event will influence plausibility
judgments. In addition, suggestions that the experience is not only generally likely, but also
personally likely will increase willingness to believe an event may have occurred. In this fashion,
studies using false feedback (e g., Kelley et al., 1996) are effective in part because the researchers
provided reasons for the participants to believe that an experience occurred to them.
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Group membership also may affect plausibility, and thus the creation of false memories. If
the new people are introduced to a group that is similar to themselves on some dimensions
(common problems, experiences, world views, etc.) and if all of the other members of the group
share common memories of an experience that the new members lack, then this may make the
experience more plausible for the new members. This seems particularly likely if the experience is
important for the group. In this case, the group’s memories act as the feedback that people who
share common characteristics are likely to have had a certain class of experiences. In this way, an
individual without memories of abuse, who participates in a group of survivors of sexual abuse,
may be receiving feedback that sexual abuse is a very probable experience for him or her. In
addition, Garry, Manning, Loftus, and Sherman (1996) showed that imagining an event influences
plausibility judgments. They asked participants to imagine events that they previously stated did
not occur. When participants later rated the events, their ratings indicated increased acceptance
that the event may have happened.
The point here is that we can manipulate people’s impression of the likelihood of a
suggested event having occurred. For example, consider again those students who doubted they
attended a wedding and thus refused to see spilling a punch bowl as likely. In such a case, the
experimenter could manipulate the participant’s judgment of the event plausibility by suggesting
some reasons for this belief perhaps the student repressed memories of weddings, or perhaps the
parents were embarrassed and thus never talked about it.
A person can believe that an event is likely, or even that the event occurred, but must still
construct a memory; an image with a narrative. Since the time of Bartlett (1932), researchers
have studied memory construction. Memory is not like videotape — people do not simply retrieve
a memory and replay the experience. Instead, people construct a memory by combining schematic
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monitoifiv^BnfcffpwryoacbolieiiflBljBBev fashion and be dependent on the preceding step, we
suspect that the processes are somewhat interactive. For example, constructing a clear image may
influence one’s assessment of the plausibility of an event having occurred (Garry et al., 1996). It
is more correct to state that all three processes are necessary for false memory creation and that
they are somewhat independent in the sense that different factors and individual differences may
influence each process. Thus in our recent research, we have focused on studying plausibility
judgments and source monitoring judgments separately.
Plausibility Judgments
One line of research in our lab has investigated how plausibility judgments can be
manipulated. Our basic goal is to provide people reasons to believe that certain events are likely
to have occurred to them. We do this by connecting childhood events that occur rarely to
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personality characteristics that we tell them they possess. Thus, our investigations of plausibility
judgments are based on an extension of the Barnum effect.
In a classic investigation of the Barnum effect, individuals take a personality test and are
later provided feedback supposedly based on the test. The test used does not particularly matter
because the feedback is not actually based on the personality test. Instead, all participants receive
identical feedback containing statements that are vague, and generally socially desirable and
positive. The typical finding is that most individuals rate the resulting personality description as
describing them. The effect is powerful and can be used as a teaching tool to demonstrate how
people blindly accept the results of psychological tests (Forer, 1949) and of horoscopes (Click,
Gottesman, & Jolton, 1989), and to lead into a discussion of ethics in research (Beins, 1993). In
addition, the effect itself has been used to understand a variety of situations in which people
accept test results as plausible and susequently diagnose themselves (c.f Goodyear, 1990).
Our own research on plausibility judgments began as a Barnum type study (Hyman,
Chesley, & Thoelke, 1997). We went into a large introductory Psychology class and on the first
day administered two personality tests; The Rotter Locus of Control Scale (1966) and the
Eysenck Personality Inventory (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968) that assesses Neuroticism and
Extroversion and includes a Lie scale. These scales were used because previous research has
found that acceptance of Barnum description is related to an External Locus of Control and to
higher scores on Neuroticism. The students were told that we were investigating the relationships
between personality and autobiographical memoiy. One week later all students were provided
with a packet containing their individual feedback and a follow-up questionnaire on
autobiographical memory. There were 104 students who completed the study (58 females, 46
males, mean age = 19.05, ^ = 1.09). The students were asked to read their personality
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description and rate how well it described them on a 7-point scale from does not describe me (1)
to describe me very well (7). To this point, the experiment was a standard Bamum-effect
demonstration.
After the students had rated the personality description, they were asked to respond to the
autobiographical memory questionnaire: this was the extension we added to the standard Bamum
methodology. All students were told that the autobiographical memory questionnaire included
some events that we thought were likely to have happened to them, and other events that we
thought were unlikely to have happened to them based on their personality type—^thus tying
together the suggested events and personality descriptions, and giving the students a reason to
believe the events were personally plausible. All students were given 10 events that we told them
were likely to have occurred based on their personality type and 10 that were unlikely based on
their personality type. The events were counter-balanced across packets so that half the students
received one set of ten likely and unlikely events and these were reversed for the remainder of the
students. The students rated each event on a 7-point scale from did not happen (1) to did happen
(7).
The events we used were selected based on a pilot survey to find events that are unlikely
to have occurred to our population of students. In the pilot survey, 45 college students reported
whether each of 70 events had happened to them before the age of 10. We selected the events
based on our own impression of low likelihood events -- events like climbing on the roof and
jumping off. We then selected 20 events that had happened to fewer that 30% of our sample.
Our goals were multiple. First, we expected to replicate the Bamum effect and find that
most of our students would accept the feedback as describing themselves. Second, we thought
that the acceptance of feedback by the students would lead them to believe that the events we tied
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to the personality description were more likely to have happened than the events that we said
were unlikely to have occurred. This would not be the creation of a false memory, but rather the
first step in the process: the step of agreeing that certain events may have happened. Third, we
suspected that individuals who were more accepting of the personality description would also be
more likely to rate the likely events as having happened to them and that these individual
differences would be tied to both locus of control and neuroticism.
The first thing to note is that most of the students rated the personality description as a
good fit. The mean rating on the 7-point scale was 5.27

= 1.13), and the distribution was

negatively skewed so that 84 students rated the description as a five or higher and only 2
individuals gave a rating of one or two.
Although there was an overall tendency for individuals to rate the events we told them
were likely as more plausible than the events we stated were unlikely, the effect was more clear
for individuals who accepted the personality description. There was a significant correlation such
that individuals who rated the description as a better description of themselves rated the events we
told them were more likely as more plausible (r = .316, p = .001). To put this another way, we
categorized the individuals based on how completely they accepted the personality description;
less acceptance for those who rated the profile a 5 or less (n = 55) and higher acceptance for
those with ratings of 6 or 7 (n = 49). We then conducted a 2x2 ANOVA investigating the effects
of profile acceptance and our feedback that events were likely or unlikely on the students’
plausibility ratings. We found no overall effect of the profile acceptance, a marginal overall effect
of our feedback (F (1, 102) = 4.136, p = .045, MSE = 0.512), and a significant interaction (F (1,
102) = 8.268, p = .005, MSE = 0.512). As can be seen in Figure 1, those who did not accept the
profile (i.e., those with ratings of 1 to 5) were unaffected by our connecting certain events to their
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personality profile, whereas those who accepted the personality profile (i.e., those with ratings of
6 or 7) rated the events we told them were connected to their profile as more plausible. There
was no effect for the events we told them were unlikely to have occurred, most likely because the
events were selected because they were unlikely for everyone.
We also found that acceptance of the personality profile and the ratings of events we told
them were likely based on the profile were correlated with some of the actual personality
measures. Acceptance of the personality profile was significantly correlated with neuroticism (r
= .323, p = .001). The plausibility ratings of the events that we told them were likely based on
their personality was related to the Rotter Locus of Control scale (1966), such that scores closer
to the external end of the scale were related to higher plausibility ratings (r = . 193, p = .049). In
addition, the plausibility ratings of the likely events was also related to neuroticism (r = .317, p =
.001) and negatively related to the lie index (r = -.194, p = .049).
These findings indicate that plausibility judgments can be manipulated. If childhood events
are connected to personality characteristics, then people may begin to believe that the events
happened ~ whether or not they remember the events. It is important to note that the personality
characterisitics need not be accurate -- it may only be necessary for individuals to believe the
personality descriptions. The acceptance of events as plausible is a step in all memory error
studies; All studies work to insure that the false suggestions are plausible to the participants.
Further systematic exploration of factors that affect plausibility is still needed.
Memory Construction and Source Monitoring
To study source monitoring judgments, we have explored how people make ‘remember’
and ‘know’ judgment for autobiographical memories. In 1985, Tulving described a basic
distinction between types of memory assessments individuals make about past experiences.
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Tulving argued, based in part on his categories of episodic memory and semantic knowledge, that
there are two basic forms of awareness associated with memory: ‘remember’ and ‘know’. When
people remember, the event is re-experienced as a personal memory encompassing both selfawareness and an awareness of some of the original sensory impressions. To remember an event
is to claim that the source of one’s memory is a personal recollection. When a past experience
comes to mind in the ‘know’ state of awareness, the event is recognized based on some source of
knowledge without the sense of a personal memory. When applied to word lists, this is often
described as familiarity absent any personal memory of hearing the word presented. For
autobiographical knowledge, the other sources include external knowledge such as general self
schematic knowledge and information from parents, friends, pictures, and diaries. People can
know that an event occurred to them without remembering the event.
A remember/know judgment of an autobiographical recollection is a type of source
monitoring judgment. When knowledge about or an image from a past experience comes to
mind, what is the source of the information? Is it a personal memory or something known from
another source? This is a judgment people may regularly be faced with when recollecting
childhood experiences: Is this my memory or is this based on the family story or family pictures?
This is also the judgment people make if some recollection is developed in response to
suggestions from other people: Is this my memory or something produced in response to the
suggestions?
Thus, Hyman, Gilstrap, Decker, and Wilkinson (1998) explored how people make the
remember versus know judgment in autobiographical memories. If this judgment is a source
monitoring judgment, then the quality of the memory for events that people remember should
differ from those associated with events they only claim to know. Johnson, Foley, Suengas, and
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Raye (1988) found that childhood events people remembered differed in many ways from
childhood experiences they imagined. The events people remembered generally included much
more sensory details of various sorts while the imagined events included information on the
cognitive operations of constructing the image. Johnson et al. argued that the quality of the
memory determined the source judgment: the more sensory detail, the more indicative these
recollections are of personal memories. Thus, if the distinction between remembered and known
events matched that between remembered and imagined events, this would support the claim that
the remember/know judgment is a source monitoring judgment.
In Hyman et al.’s first experiment, participants first learned the definitions of remember
and know. After the participants understood the definitions, they wrote a description of a
childhood event (before the age of ten) for each of three categories: remember, know, and unsure
if remembered or known. After they described all three events, they were asked to rate each
memory on eight dimensions, including: visual detail, other sensory detail, clarity of location,
clarity of time, amount of emotion, doubts about accuracy, frequency of thinking about the event,
and whether the event had serious implications. These dimensions were based on the Memory
Characteristics Questionnaire used by Johnson et al. (1988).
Hyman et al. found that childhood events people claimed to remember differed from
events they claimed to only know on a variety of measures of memory quality, including: the
amount of visual and other sensory details, the clarity of location and time knowledge, the amount
of emotion, and confidence. In essence, the remembered events are clearer and contain more
information. These-results, for the most part, mirrored the Johnson et al. results (1988) and
therefore can be viewed as evidence for the remember/know judgment being a type of source
monitoring judgment.
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One way of explaining this is that the events people know happened, but can not
remember, are not a product of a personal recollection. Instead, known memories are the result
of thinking about the event, hearing about the event, or imagining what took place during that
experience. Thus, the source of a memory determines the quality of the memory; one has access
to greater event elaboration for things one remembers.
On the other hand, this relationship could run in the opposite direction: the quality of the
memory could determine the source to which someone attributes their memory. That is, if the
memory is recalled with greater visual clarity, emotion, and sensory details, then one might label it
as a personal memory rather than a memory that is simply known. This is congruent with
Johnson’s description of the source monitoring process (Johnson et al., 1988; Johnson et al.,
1993). People make a source judgment based in part of the qualities of the constructed memory.
If people construct a more elaborated recollection, they should be more likely to attribute the
recollection to personal memory, to something they remember. Thus asking people to imagine a
false childhood experiences (Hyman & Pentland, 1996) and repeatedly imagining an event (Goff
& Roediger, 1997) increases false memories, because people create more elaborated
representations of the experiences.
In keeping with this view, adding more memory qualities to a known event should result in
people being more likely to claim they remember the experience. Therefore, the goal of further
research exploring remember/know judgments in autobiographical memories is to determine what
factors lead people to alter their source judgment for autobiographical recollection. In two
additional experiments, Hyman et al. (1998) had people start with a childhood experience they
claimed to know but not remember. They then asked the participants to form mental images of
the experience and answer questions based on their images. Finally, individuals rated their

False Memory, False Self — 23
recollection on a 7-point scale from know (1) to remember (7). Compared to a control group,
individuals who imagined and described a known experience did rate their previously known
memories further from the know end of the scale and towards the remember end, resulting in an
unsure (middle) rating.
Wilkinson and Hyman (in press) used the same basic methodology to explore individual
differences in source monitoring judgments. As in Hyman et al. (1998), they asked participants to
start with a known childhood experience and imagine the experience in more detail. They found
that individuals who showed more change in their source judgments tended to score higher on the
Dissociative Experiences Scale, but were no more likely to make memory errors in remembering
word lists of semantically related words (Roediger & McDermott, 1995).
In summary, it appears that the remember/know distinction is a valuable tool for exploring
source monitoring decisions for autobiographical experiences. In future research, we plan to
explore how other factors influence this judgment. For example, will adding other characteristics
to know events also lead people to claim to remember the event? Hyman et al. (1995) noted that
making connections to self-relevant knowledge was related to the creation of false childhood
memories. If people start with an event they know, focusing on the role of the self in the memory
may add information unavailable from external sources (such as imagining their own thoughts and
emotional responses during the event, Hyman & Neisser, 1992) which may lead to claims of
remembering the experience (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995). In addition, this method may also be
valuable for exploring how social pressures affect the source monitoring criterion that people
apply to their memories. It may also be possible to use similar methodologies to convince people
that they do not remember something but only know it instead. Perhaps focusing people on the
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other possible sources of their knowledge of an experience will lead to claims of knowing rather
than remembering.
Since deciding if a recollection is something remembered or something known is a source
monitoring decision, this points to an additional concern: The difficulty in reliably discriminating
true from false memories. The distribution of true and false memories in terms of sensory details
will overlap -- some true memories will be vague, some false memories will use true sensory
information in the construction of the recollection, and some false memories will have been
rehearsed and elaborated. Nonetheless, in general true memories should contain more sensory
details than false memories since they are derived from real experiences. Johnson and her
colleagues (1988) found that memories contained more sensory information than imagined
experiences and Hyman et al. (1998) found that remembered events contained more than known
events. Thus many researchers have been able to find an overall difference between true and false
memories in several ratings (Hyman & Pentland, 1996), in remember/know judgments (Conway,
Collins, Gathercole, & Anderson, 1996), and in the content of the verbal descriptions (Pezdek, et
al., 1997).
However, the overall difference masks two important questions: first, can recovered true
memories be discriminated from false memories, and second, can false memories that have been
repetitively elaborated be discriminated from true memories. Hyman and Pentland (1996) had
individuals who recovered true memories and created false childhood memories over the course
of the three interviews. When they asked individuals to rate all their memories, they found that
the true memories that they could recall throughout the sessions were the most clearly and
confidently remembered. They also found that recovered true memories (events not recalled in
the first session and later remembered) and false memories were both rated lower than the always
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remembered true memories. In addition, recovered true memories and created false memories
were not reliably different from one another. Hence, there may be no way to discern recovered
from false memories. To our knowledge, no one has looked at how false memories that are held
for an extended time compare to true memories. We suspect that as sensory information is added
to false memories, they will become more difficult to discern from true memories.
False Memories. False Self
People create false memories. Sometimes the errors will be small: adding someone to a
party who wasn’t actually there, thinking one’s role was larger than it actually was (Ross &
Sicoly, 1979), remembering the pain as more severe than it was (Ross, 1989), or downplaying
personal foibles and inflating one’s value (Greenwald, 1980). Sometimes the errors will be
larger—forgetting events that were previously important for self-definition (Hirst, 1994; Usita,
Hyman, & Herman, 1998), creating an entire event in one’s childhood (e.g., Hyman et al., 1995),
or creating an adult experience (Kassin, 1997; Kassin & Kiechel, 1996). Since the self is
constructed from memories, the self will be a false self, based on beliefs and memories that do not
accurately represent the past.
Although many of these changes may simply serve the goal of preserving a confident ego
(Greenwald, 1980), others may be more damaging. If a person comes to believe that he or she
was abused as a child, this is a change that may have negative effects on the ego. This change
could alter anyone’s self conception — even individuals who experienced a less than ideal
childhood may find child abuse a qualitative change in their understanding of their past. This is
clear when considering the narratives of individuals who recover memories of abuse (e.g., Bass &
Davis, 1988; Pendergrast, 1995). The abuse becomes a part of how these people define
themselves, something they must integrate with their life stories. In Jane Smiley’s fictional case of
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Ginny, the new memory changed her life to the point where she indicated life as she knew it ended
and a new life began. These changes may be difficult to reconcile with previous self conceptions
for some individuals but may provide a narrative that accounts for many previously unexplained
instances in one’s life.
The memories that include abuse will not only affect self-definition, but will also affect an
individual’s interactions with others. If the accused perpetrator is a member of the family or a
family friend, the memories will likely cause schisms in the relationships. The memories may force
a person to re-evaluate the types of social interactions she or he has with others.
These changes in self-concept and relationships with others are justified when the
recovered memories are of events that actually happened. In contrast, if the individual has created
false memories, then the changes are a catastrophic error. The individual develops a false sense of
self based on events that never occurred. The individual interrupts relationships with important
individuals for a false cause.
This is the argument that has been played out in many families and in court cases across
the country for the last several years. Individuals recover memories of abuse. They rewrite their
personal narrative and change their relationships based on the memories. Families often contend
that the memories are false—that they are the result of suggestions and social pressure. Families
argue that they have been wrongfully cut off from children, siblings, and grandchildren. In the
absence of some evidence external to memory, it is difficult, if not impossible, to know which
narrative corresponds to historical truth.
Although these cases are dramatic, they exist because they are instances of how human
memory functions. The inability to differentiate between false memories and historically accurate
memories raises the question of how to balance historical and narrative truth (Spence, 1982). If a
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person believes that a memory is accurate, how is society to deal with this? Are we to accept that
person’s belief and focus on promoting health and welfare? Or are we to question that belief and
take an investigative role? These questions are relevant for most memories discussed in therapy
and not just memories of child abuse. Although we need to be concerned with distinguishing false
and historically accurate memories, we must not lose sight of the practical implications of
individuals dealing with what they believe is their past.
Memory is always constructed. What we remember will be constructed from residual
information and from general schematic knowledge structures. In addition, memory construction
often takes place within a social context and in response to social pressures. Thus the memories
we construct reflect the suggestions and stories told by others. Many of our childhood memories
may actually be stories that we heard others, such as parents or siblings, tell. We imagine the
stories, and perhaps eventually adopt the image and story as our own memory. Much of the past
is constructed in a social environment. This may explain how individuals fail to remember abuse
or come to mislabel abuse -- they have adopted the story of the perpetrator (see Hyman &
Kleinknecht, in press). As Hyman and Pentland (1996) suggested, life is an ongoing
misinformation experiment, where the outcome is that the seif is memory’s illusion.
The fact that memory is constructed also means that history is constructed. Consider the
ongoing spin doctoring in the political arena. The need to write a favorable interpretation of the
present and the past to argue for a certain political viewpoint has inspired numerous versions of
political events. Consider the current effort to write the generally accepted version of President
Clinton’s affair with Monica Lewinsky. Did the President lie? Did he give honest, but not
particularly revealing answers? Is independent prosecutor Starr an honest public servant striving
to uncover serious crimes? Is he instead a man with a political agenda out to discredit a President
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with whom he disagrees? Although all of us alive now will have lived through these episodes, the
eventual story we develop will be dependent on which narrative we adopt. History is written by
the victors, or perhaps the victors are those who write a version of history that becomes the
accepted version. In essence, we are living the nightmare of George Orwell’s (1949) 1984. We
may not be experiencing the negative totalitarian state described, but we certainly are
experiencing the constant historical and personal revisions.
Nonetheless, there must be some limit on how malleable memory is. If memory was constantly
being altered by the whims of our most recent interactions, then surely these changes would be
problematic. We should experience difficulties accurately tracking the world, and conversations
would be constant miscommunication in which people would have difficulties identifying
experiences they shared. Hyman (in press) argued that the malleability of memory is an evolved
trait that must balance opposing pressures. On one side are pressures favoring memory
malleability -- pressures like updating memory to continue to recognize constancy in the face of
small changes and pressures to change memory to better fit with social groups. On the other side
are pressures for memory accuracy ~ pressure to be able to learn from the past and be able to
recognize shared experiences. The outcome of these pressures appears to be a memory system
that is generally reliable. The gist will generally be accurate, as will most remembered details.
Nonetheless, the system needs to be integrative. This means that schematic intrusions will occur.
In addition, the memory system serves social interaction, and thus response to social pressure will
also be observed. Therefore, extreme errors are possible, although most likely infrequent.
Conversely, there should be times when memory is highly accurate. Thus the self as defined by
autobiographical memory will be generally resilient, providing us with some confidence in who we
are and who we can become.
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Figure Caption
Figure 1. Plausibility Ratings based on Profile Acceptance and Feedback that Events were
were not Related to the Personality Profile.
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